This paper examines two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a maximum quota; thus, the number of doctors assigned to a hospital cannot exceed a certain limit. In our model, in contrast, a hospital has a fixed budget; that is, the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to doctors is constrained. With budget constraints, stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence, we extend the "matching with contracts" model of Hatfield and Milgrom so that it deals with approximately stable matchings where each of the hospitals' utilities after deviation can increase by a factor up to a certain amount. We then propose two novel mechanisms that efficiently return a stable matching that exactly satisfies the budget constraints. Specifically, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, our first mechanism achieves the best possible bound. We also explore a special case on which a simple mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors, while maintaining the best possible bound of the general case.
Introduction
This paper studies a two-sided, one-to-many matching model when there are budget constraints on one side (a firm or hospital), that is, the total amount of wages that it can pay to the other side (a worker or doctor) is limited. The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed, as illustrated by the comprehensive surveys of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) or Manlove (2013) . Rather than fixed budgets, maximum quotas limiting the total number of doctors that each hospital can hire are typically used.
Some real-world examples are subject to matching with such budget constraints: a college can offer stipends to recruit better students when the budget for admission is limited; a firm can offer wages to workers under the condition that employment costs depend on earnings in the previous accounting period; a public hospital can offer salaries to doctors when the total amount relies on funds from the govern-ment; and so on. To establish our model and concepts, we use doctor-hospital matching as a running example.
To date, most papers on matching with monetary transfers assume that budgets are unrestricted, e.g., Kelso and Crawford (1982) . When they are restricted, stable matchings may fail to exist (Mongell and Roth 1986 ; Abizada 2016) . There are several other possibilities to circumvent the nonexistence problem. Abizada (2016) modifies the notion of stability in a different way and proposes a variant of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism that produces a pairwise, instead of coalitional, stable matching and is strategy-proof for doctors. Dean, Goemans, and Immorlica (2006) assume that hospitals' priorities are lexicographic to ensure the existence of a stable matching. We instead allow each hospital to have an additive utility, but the existence is not guaranteed yet. Kawase and Iwasaki (2017) focus on near-feasible matchings that exceed each budget of the hospitals by a certain amount. Their mechanisms find a "nearby" instance with a stable matching for each instance of a matching problem. This paper focuses on approximately stable matchings where the participants are willing to change the assignments only for a multiplicative improvement of a certain amount (Arkin et al. 2009 ). This idea can be interpreted as one in which a hospital in a blocking pair changes his match as soon as his utility after the change increases by any (arbitrarily small) amount. Arkin et al. (2009) examine a stable roommate problem, which is a non-bipartite one-to-one matching problem, while we examine a bipartite one-tomany matching problem. It is reasonable for a hospital to change his assignment only in favor of a significant improvement (the grass may be greener on the other side, but it takes effort to cross the fence).
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that these studies, except the works of Abizada (2016) and Kawase and Iwasaki (2017) , discuss no strategic issue, that is, misreporting a doctor's preference may be profitable. The literature on matching has found strategy-proofness for doctors, i.e., no doctor has an incentive to misreport her preference, to be a key property in a wide variety of settings (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 2003) .
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, we modify the generalized DA algorithm and devise a new property, which we call α-approximation, on the matching with con- 
Model
This section describes a model for two-sided matchings with budget constraints. A market is a tuple (D, H, X, ≻ D , u, s) where each component is defined as follows: There is a finite set of doctors D = {d 1 , . . . , d n } and a finite set of hospitals H = {h 1 , . . . , h m }. Let X denote a finite set of contracts where each contract x ∈ X is associated with a doctor x D ∈ D and a hospital x H ∈ H. Let s : X → R + be the size function, where R + is the set of nonnegative real numbers. A contract x means that hospital x H offers s(x) fraction of its budget as a wage to doctor x D . For any subset of contracts
′ means that d strictly prefers x to x ′ . ∅ indicates a null contract. Let u : X → R + be the utility function. We assume that the utility of each hospital is additive; that is, for any two sets of contracts
We call a subset of contracts
We then obtain a stability concept. Definition 1 (α-stability (Arkin et al. 2009) ). We say a matching X ′ is α-stable if there exists no α-blocking coalition.
As we can see, 1-stability is equivalent to the standard stability concept. Intuitively, the hospitals are willing to change the assignments only for a multiplicative improvement of α. This idea regards the value of α as a switching cost for the hospitals. Note that we can also define the second condition in an additive manner, i.e., u(X ′′ ) > u(X ′ h ) + α. However, since this does not satisfy scale invariance, the value of α is not well bounded. In fact, when a market has no α-stable matching in the additive sense, a market with the hospitals' utilities that are multiplied by 100 has no 100α-stable matching.
A mechanism is a function that takes a profile of doctors' preferences as input and returns a matching X ′ . We say a mechanism is α-stable if it always produces an α-stable matching for certain α. We also say a mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if no doctor ever has any incentive to misreport her preference, regardless of what the other doctors report.
To design and analyze a mechanism, we modify the matching with contract framework (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) for our approximate stability concept. It uses choice functions Ch D : 2 X → 2
h . There are alternative ways to define the choice function of each hospital Ch h . As we discuss later, the mechanisms considered in this paper can be expressed by the generalized DA with different formulations of Ch H .
In particular, we construct it from a class of sequential choice functions that receives a sequence of contracts.
Definition 2. Let X h = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and S n be the symmetric group of degree n. A sequential choice function on X h is a function Ch h over a sequence of distinct contracts in X h such that
for all σ ∈ S n and 0 ≤ k ≤ n, and
for all σ ∈ S n and 0 ≤ k < n.
Here (1) signifies that the choice must be taken from available contracts and (2) signifies that, if a contract x is rejected at some point, then it is also rejected ever after.
This framework characterizes a class of mechanisms called the generalized DA mechanism. If a mechanismspecifically, the choice function of every hospital-satisfies three properties, substitutability, irrelevance of rejected contracts, and law of aggregate demand, then it always finds a "stable" allocation and is strategy-proof for doctors (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) . This result is preserved because a sequential choice function can induce a (standard) choice function if it is order-invariant.
holds for any σ, τ ∈ S n and 0 ≤ k ≤ n such that
Thus, if a sequential choice function is order-invariant, the induced choice function satisfies substitutability. The induced choice function satisfies law of aggregate demand if it further satisfies size-monotonicity.
1
Definition 4 (Size-monotonicity). A sequential choice function Ch h on X h = {x 1 , . . . , x n } is size-monotone if
holds for any σ ∈ S n and 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Here, strategy-proofness is still characterized by orderinvariance and size-monotonicity because hospital choice does not affect doctor preferences. However, even if a sequential choice function for each hospital is order-invariant, the mechanism employed with the function does not always find a stable matching because such a matching may not exist in the presence of budget constraints.
Finally, for Lemma 2, let us briefly explain a matroid, which is a set system (X, F ) with the following properties: (i) ∅ ∈ F ; (ii) F ⊆ G ∈ F implies F ∈ F ; and (iii) F, G ∈ F , |F | < |G| implies the existence of x ∈ G \ F such that F ∪ {x} ∈ F . Notice that a subset F of X is called an independent set if F belongs to F .
Negative Results
The nonexistence of stable matchings raises the issue of the complexity of deciding the existence of a (1-)stable matching. McDermid and Manlove (2010) considered a special case of our model and proved NP-hardness. Hamada et al. (2017) examined a similar model to ours and proved that the existence problem is Σ P 2 -complete. With approximately stable matchings in Definition 1, we provide the following hardness result. Theorem 1. For any constant α > 1, distinguishing whether a given market has a 1-stable matching or has no α-stable matching is NP-complete.
We prove the NP-completeness by reducing from the subset sum problem (Garey and Johnson 1979) , though details are omitted due to space limitations.
Furthermore, to obtain an approximately stable matching, the amount of approximation does not fall 1 1−s , where s indicates the largest wage size among the given contracts, i.e., s = max x∈X s(x). Theorem 2. For any positive reals 1/2 < s < 1 and ǫ, there exists a market such that s(x) ≤ s for all x and no 1 1−s − ǫ -stable matching exists. We provide the instance below to prove this theorem due to the space limitation (Please see the full version for additional details).
Proof. Let δ be a sufficiently small positive real and α = 1/(1 − s). Let n = ⌊1/δ 3 ⌋, m = ⌈1/s⌉, and l = ⌊(1 − s)/δ⌋ + 1.
Consider a market with n + 1 doctors and n − l + 1 hospitals:
. . , h n }. The set of contracts X is given as
where
The doctors' preferences are given as follows:
. . , l), and
Then, we claim that there exists no (α − ǫ)-stable matching in the market instance.
Note that we have no non-trivial lower bound of the approximation ratio when s ≤ 1/2.
Framework for Approximate Stability
This section introduces a new property, which we call α-approximation, and modifies the matching with contract framework (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) . Let A(X h ) be the set of sequences of distinct contracts in X h . A sequential choice function Ch h is called α-approximate if Ch h always chooses a feasible subset of given contracts with utility at least 1/α times the optimal one.
We note that a sequential choice function can be viewed as an online algorithm for a removable knapsack problem and an α-competitive online algorithm (Komm 2016) implies an α-approximate sequential choice function.
Let us next introduce a modified version of the generalized DA mechanism, which is formally given as Algorithm 1. This mechanism uses choice functions for the doctors (Ch d ) d∈D and sequential choice functions for the hospitals (Ch h ) h∈H . Initially, each doctor is set to be unmatched. Then, an unmatched doctor d proposes to her most preferred contract x that has not been rejected and the proposed hospital x H chooses a set of contracts Ch xH (a xH ), where a xH is the sequence of proposed contracts for hospital x H . The proposal procedure continues as long as an unmatched doctor has a non-rejected acceptable contract.
6 append x to the end of a xH ;
We next prove that α-approximate choice functions lead to approximately stable matchings. Note that although the output of the generalized DA depends on which doctor is selected in line 4, Theorem 3 holds regardless of the output of the mechanism.
Theorem 3. If the sequential choice function
Ch h is α-approximate for every hospital h ∈ H, then the generalized DA produces an α-stable matching X ′ ⊆ X.
h n ) by the definition of the algorithm.
We prove that X ′ is α-stable by contradiction. Suppose that X ′′ ⊆ X h is an α-blocking coalition for X ′ . Then,
which is a contradiction. Here, the first inequality holds since X ′′ is an α-blocking coalition and the second inequality holds since Ch h is α-approximate and
It must be emphasized that this framework can be applied to other types of constraints, e.g., matroid intersection constraints. The typical example is diversity constraints in school choice programs where a school is required to balance the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status (Kurata et al. 2017) . The framework also works even when each hospital has a submodular utility. Designing such mechanisms is our immediate future work and it will be achieved with online algorithms for the corresponding problems 
Approximately Stable Mechanisms
In matching with constraints (Kamada and Kojima 2015; Goto et al. Kurata et al. 2017) , designing a desirable mechanism essentially tailors the choice functions for hospitals to satisfy the necessary properties and constraints simultaneously. The design task is difficult because the given sequences of contracts for hospitals depend on the (sequential) choice functions themselves and, hence, they are unpredictable. We tackle this challenging task as an analogue to online algorithms for knapsack problems.
Non-Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes an approximately stable mechanism that achieves the best possible stability bound, but is not strategy-proof for doctors. The sequential choice functions greedily choose contracts according to decreasing order of utility per size (i.e., utility per wage). Formally, let us consider the functions defined in Algorithm 2.
2 Note that we can compute the choice in O(k log k) time.
Let us next illustrate this mechanism via an example. 
To conclude, our algorithm returns the matching
We argue that the sequential choice function Ch h satisfies the following property:
Proof. Let us consider a sequence of distinct contracts (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ A(X h ). Note that Ch h satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) since Ch h (x 1 , . . . ,
s(x i ) ≤ 1, then the sequential choice function returns all the contracts and therefore satisfies (3). Thus, we assume that
Let ℓ be the largest index such that
Then, by a simple induction, we can see that {x σ(1) , . . . , x σ(ℓ) } ⊆ Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k ). Therefore, we obtain u(Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k )) is at least
Here, the first inequality holds since
is monotone nonincreasing for j and the second inequality holds by 
This mechanism is not strategy-proof for doctors (See Proposition 1 in the full version).

Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism
This subsection proposes another stable mechanism that does not achieve the best possible stability bound, but is strategy-proof for doctors. Let us consider a set system (X h , F h ), where . We can easily check that the set system (X h , F h ) is a transversal matroid for each h ∈ H ( Oxley 1992) . In addition, we have s(
The second sequential choice function Ch h chooses the maximum utility independent set by a greedy algorithm. The formal definition is given in Algorithm 3.
We claim that the choice function satisfies the following property. Proof. Let (x 1 , . . . , x k ) be the input of the choice function. We prove that, for any X * ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x k },
holds when s(X * ) ≤ 1 and
. Let us consider a set of contracts X * = {y 1 , . . . , y ℓ } where s(y 1 ) ≥ · · · ≥ s(y ℓ ). Then, we have s(y i ) ≤ 1/i for i = 1, . . . , ℓ because 1 ≥ s(y 1 )+· · ·+s(y i ) ≥ i·s(y i ). Thus, we can partition X * into γ sets X 1 , . . . , X γ that satisfy X i ∈ F h for all i = 1, . . . , γ. Indeed, we can obtain the partition by setting
which proves the theorem.
Lemma 3. For each hospital h, the sequential choice function Ch h defined in Algorithm 3 satisfies order-invariance and size-monotonicity.
Proof. The choice function is clearly order-invariant, since the greedy algorithm for matroids, which finds the maximum utility independent set, is not affected by the input sequence order (Babaioff, Hartline, and Kleinberg 2009 
Proportional Utilities
This section examines a special case in which each hospital has a utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to its size. Formally, for every h ∈ H and x ∈ X h , u(x) = β h · s(x) holds where β h (> 0) is a constant that only depends on the hospital. We call such a market a proportional market. W.l.o.g., we may assume that β h = 1 for all h ∈ H.
To admit an approximately stable matching, the amount of approximation improves to a constant. We first provide an intractability result. Theorem 6. For any ǫ > 0, there exists a proportional market with no
2 . Consider a market with three doctors D = {d 1 , d 2 , d 3 } and two hospitals H = {h 1 , h 2 }. The set of contracts is X = {x, y,ŷ, z,ẑ}, where
Similarly, we can easily check that there exists a (φ−ǫ)-blocking coalition for any matching and hence this market has no (φ − ǫ)-stable matching.
However, distinguishing whether a given proportional market has 2 ). Note that φ + 1 = φ 2 holds. To obtain the mechanism, we apply an online algorithm provided by Iwama and Taketomi (2002) for the (proportional case) removable knapsack problem as a sequential choice function. Let us divide the set of contracts into three classes-small, medium, and large. These are defined as
It should be noted that, if the algorithm chooses a set of contracts with a total size of at least 1/φ, then it is φ-approximate since
Thus, if some large contracts have been given, then it is sufficient to select one of them. Also, if it can choose two medium contracts together, then it is sufficient to select both because 2(1 − 1/φ) > 1/φ. If a given sequence of contracts contains medium contracts, but it cannot choose two medium contracts together and no large contract exists, the algorithm keeps the smallest medium contract. The formal definition of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 4. Note that the function Ch h satisfies (1) and (2) since
We obtain the next lemma through the techniques of Iwama and Taketomi (2002) . Lemma 4. The sequential choice function defined in Algorithm 4 is φ-approximate. Now, with Theorem 3, we obtain the following theorem: Theorem 7. For any proportional market, the generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 4 produces a φ-stable matching. In addition, the mechanism can be implemented to run in O(|X| log |X|) time.
Strategy-Proof Stable Mechanism Achieving the Best Possible Bound for Additive Utilities
This subsection provides another stable mechanism for the proportional markets that does not have a constant stability bound, but is strategy-proof for doctors. We employ a sequential choice function Ch h that greedily chooses the contracts according to increasing order of size while keeping the budget constraint. Formally, we define this as Algorithm 5.
2 Sort {x 1 , . . . , x k } according to increasing order of size; 3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do 4 let x be the ith smallest contract;
Let us first claim that the choice function is sequential. Since it clearly satisfies (1), let us check (2). W.l.o.g., we may assume that s(x 1 ) < s(x 2 ) < · · · < s(x k ) because the hospitals' choices depend not on the order of the input sequence, but on size. If
. . , x k ) must be empty and hence (2) holds. Thus, we assume that
Let ℓ be the largest index such that ℓ i=1 s(x i ) ≤ 1. If the (ℓ + 1)st contract is chosen, the budget is exceeded. We then have Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = {x 1 , . . . , x ℓ } and {x 1 , . . . , x k } \ Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = {x ℓ+1 , . . . , x k }. With the (k + 1)st contract x k+1 , if s(x k+1 ) > s(x ℓ+1 ), (2) holds because Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ) = {x 1 , . . . , x ℓ }. Otherwise, we have Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ) ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , x k+1 } and hence (2) holds. Thus, the choice function Ch h is sequential. We further claim that it satisfies the following properties: Lemma 5. For each hospital h, the choice function defined in Algorithm 5 is order-invariant, size-monotone, and
Proof. First, each choice function is clearly order-invariant from the definition. We thus assume without loss of generality that s(x 1 ) < s(x 2 ) < · · · < s(x k ) throughout this proof.
Second, we observe that each choice function Ch h is sizemonotone. To see this, it is sufficient to prove
for any sequence of contracts (x 1 , . . . , x k , x k+1 ). Recall that ℓ is the largest index such that the budget is not exceeded. Then, we have Ch h (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = {x 1 , . . . , x ℓ }. We consider two cases for the 
Otherwise, for the index ℓ, we have
Thus, 
Conclusion
This paper examined matching with budget constraints and introduced a concept of approximately stable matchings. First, we extended the existing framework and proposed two novel mechanisms that return a stable matching in polynomial time: one is strategy-proof for doctors and the other is not. Second, we derived the bounds of the utilities' increment by coalitional deviation. The best possible bound is obtained by sacrificing strategy-proofness for additive utilities. Finally, we examined a case in which hospitals have proportional utilities and found another two mechanisms that achieve better approximation ratios.
Omitted proofs
In this section, we provide omitted proofs. Theorem 1. For any constant α > 1, distinguishing whether a given market has a 1-stable matching or has no α-stable matching is NP-complete.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first observe that the problem is in the class NP. A witness would be a 1-stable matching X ′ . Here X ′ is a 1-stable matching if
Since we only want to distinguish the existence of 1-stable matching and nonexistence of α-stable matching, it is sufficient to check
We can check the condition for each h in polynomial time because we can find α-approximate solution of max{u(X) :
xD }} in polynomial time for any fixed α > 1 (Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004) . Thus, the problem is in the class NP.
We then prove the NP-hardness by reducing the subset sum problem-given n + 1 positive integers a 1 , . . . , a n , t, ask whether there exists a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that i∈I a i = t. Let a 1 , . . . , a n and t be an instance of subset sum problem and let a = n j=1 a j . Also, let m = ⌈3α 2 ⌉. Without loss of generality, we assume that a > t > 0. Consider the following market:
..,n, j=1,...,m−1 ).
We claim that there exists a 1-stable matching if the subset sum instance is yes-instance and there exists no α-stable matching otherwise.
First, suppose that the subset sum instance is yes-instance. Let I * ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that i∈I a i = t. Then, we observe that
is a 1-stable matching. Since every doctor d j i (i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m) matches with the best contract, it is sufficient to consider coalitions that contain some r i . Let X ′′ = {r i : i ∈ I} for a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then, u(X ′′ ) = i∈I a i ≤ t−1 and hence X ′′ is not a 1-blocking coalition. Thus, X ′ is a 1-stable matching. Next, we claim that X ′ is not α-stable if a matching X ′ satisfies X ′ ∩ {r i * ,1 , r i * ,2 } = ∅ for some i * . Note that, if the subset sum instance is no-instance, there exists such an index i * for any matching X ′ . Let us assume that X ′ is an α-stable matching. We consider the following two cases. i,j H = h j (i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2), • s(x 1,1 ) = s(x 3,1 ) = 1/2, s(x 1,2 ) = s(x 2,1 ) = s(x 2,2 ) = s(x 3,2 ) = s, • u(x 1,1 ) = 1, u(x 1,2 ) = 4, u(x 2,1 ) = 4, u(x 2,2 ) = 1, u(x 3,1 ) = 2, u(x 3,2 ) = 2, • x 1,1 ≻ d1 x 1,2 , x 2,2 ≻ d2 x 2,1 , x 3,2 ≻ d3 x 3,1 .
For this market, the generalized DA outputs a matching {x 1,2 , x 3,1 }. However, if d 3 misreports her preference as x 2,1 ≻ ′ d3 x 2,2 , then the generalized DA gives a matching {x 1,2 , x 2,1 , x 3,1 }. Thus, the mechanism is not strategy-proof for doctors since d 2 has an incentive to misreport. 2 . We prove the NP-hardness by reducing the subset sum problem. Let a 1 , . . . , a n and t be an instance of subset sum problem and let a = n j=1 a j . Without loss of generality, we assume that a > t > 0.
Consider a market with n + 3 doctors D = {d 1 , . . . , d n+2 } and four hospitals H = {h 1 , . . . , h 4 }. The set of constracts is X = n i=1 {x i,1 , x i,2 , x i,3 } ∪ {y,ŷ, z,ẑ} where The doctors' preferences are given as follows:
≻ di : x i,1 ≻ di x i,2 ≻ di x i,3 , (i = 1, . . . , n), ≻ dn+1 : y ≻ dn+1ŷ , ≻ dn+2 :ẑ ≻ dn+2 z.
We claim that there exists a 1-stable matching if the subset sum instance is yes-instance and there exists no (φ − ǫ)-stable matching otherwise.
Suppose that the subset sum instance is yes-instance. Let I * ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that i∈I a i = t. Then, we can observe that X ′′ := {x i,1 : i ∈ I * } ∪ {x i,2 : i ∈ I * } ∪ {y,ẑ} is a 1-stable matching. Conversely, suppose that the subset sum instance is noinstance. We claim that there exists no (φ − ǫ)-stable matching by contradiciton. Let us assume that X ′′ is an (φ − ǫ)-stable matching. Since the subset sum instance is noinstance, there exists an index i * ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that X ′′ ∩ {x i * ,1 , x i * ,2 } = ∅. Then, by a similar discussion to the proof of Theorem 6, X ′′ is not (φ − ǫ)-stable, which is a contradiction.
